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ARGUMENT 
NEITHER STARE DECISIS NOR RES JUDICATA BAR THIS 
COURT FROM CORRECTING THE COURT OF APPEALS' 
ERRONEOUS CONCLUSION THAT THE DISTRICT COURT'S 
MODIFICATIONS OF THE JUDGMENT WERE IMMATERIAL, 
WHICH IS IN DIRECT CONFLICT WITH UTAH CASE LAW. 
The State argues that the court of appeals correctly 
dismissed the notice of appeal in the instant case based on the 
principles of stare decisis and res judicata. Stare decisis and 
res judicata do not act as a bar in the instant case for the 
reasons set forth below. 
According to the doctrine of stare decisis, as it applies to 
the court of appeals as a multiple panel court, each panel is 
required to observe the prior decisions of another. State v. 
Thuzman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1269 (Utah 1993). However, stare decisis 
does not require that each panel adhere to its own or another 
panel's prior decisions with the same inflexibility as when a 
decision of a higher court is involved. State v. Menzies, 889 
P.2d 393, 399 n.3 (Utah 1994) (citations omitted). Rather, a 
panel may overrule its own or another panel's decision when the 
decision is clearly erroneous or conditions have changed. Id. 
(citing State v. Dungan, 149 Ariz. 357, 361, 718 P.2d 1010, 1014 
(1986)). 
Furthermore, stare decisis is more flexible when applied to 
courts of last resort. See Menzies, 889 P.2d at 399; State v. 
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Sims, 881 P.2d 840, 843 n.7 (Utah 1994) (citing State v. Menzies, 
889 P.2d 393, 399 (Utah 1994)). "Stare decisis is not an 
inexorable command; rather, it 4s a principle of policy and not 
a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision.'" Payne 
v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 2609 (1991) 
(quoting Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119, 60 S.Ct. 444, 
451 (1940)). In addition, res judicata is to be invoked only 
after a careful inquiry because otherwise it might act as a 
blockade of the "unexplored paths that may lead to truth." See 18 
Moore's Federal Practice § 131.24 [6] (3d ed. 1997); Brown v. 
Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 132, 99 S.Ct. 2205, 2211 (1979). 
Applying these principles to the instant case, the court of 
appeals' prior decision, in State v. Garner, 2002 UT App 238, that 
the modifications to the sentence were immaterial was clearly 
erroneous. The clearly erroneous nature of the court of appeals' 
conclusion is demonstrated by this Court's decision in ProMax Dev. 
Corp. v. Raile, 2000 UT 4, 998 P.2d 254, where this Court held 
that uin the interest of judicial economy, a trial court must 
determine the amount of attorney fees awardable to a party before 
the judgment becomes final for the purposes of appeal." Id. at 
115. 
Shortly thereafter, in Sittner v. Schriever, 2000 UT 45, 2 
P. 3d 442, this Court, utiliising the ProMax ruling as a basis, 
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expressly overruled Taylor v. Hansen, 958 P.2d 923, 927-28 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1998), and concluded that "Sittner's appeal is not 
precluded by his failure to file a notice of appeal within thirty 
days of the March 25 judgment because that judgment -- which 
failed to fix the amount of attorney fees to be awarded -- was not 
final for purposes of appeal." Id. at fl9. In its ruling, this 
court further reasoned that "[i]ndeed, a final, appealable order 
results 'when the court not only relieves a party of judgment, but 
enters a corrected judgment so that there is nothing further to be 
decided by the district court.'" Id. at f22 (quoting 12 Moore's 
Federal Practice § 60.68[2] (3d ed. 1997)). 
Mr. Garner, in the case at bar, entered a conditional guilty 
plea to Burglary and Criminal Mischief, preserving the right to 
appeal the district court's denial of his motion to dismiss the 
Information.1 As part of that conditional guilty plea, Mr. Garner 
agreed to pay restitution in an amount to be determined at a later 
date. As a material part of Mr. Garner's guilty plea, the State 
agreed to provide a letter to the Alabama Board of Parole, 
"recommending no additional time for those guilty pleas."2 
*As the basis for his Motion to Dismiss, Mr. Garner argued that 
the State violated the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD) 
statute codified at Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-5 (1999). 
2In violation of the plea agreement, the prosecutor wrote a 
letter to the Director of Inmate Classification at Kilby Correctional 
Facility, stating, among other things, "As part of the plea agreement 
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On July 26, 2001, the district court sentenced Mr. Garner to 
an indeterminate term of zero to five years in the Utah State 
Prison to run concurrent with the offense in Alabama. During 
sentencing, the district court expressly reserved the issue of 
restitution by stating, "Restitution will be left open subject to 
any information coming forward and your right to a hearing." 
The district court signed the original Sentence, Judgment, 
and Commitment on July 27, 2001, expressly stating that the 
restitution amount "will remain open at this time." Thereafter, 
on May 14, 2 002, the district court modified the Sentence, 
Judgment, and Commitment, concluding that the conditions of the 
guilty plea had been satisfied by the State. The district court 
also modified the Sentence, Judgment, and Commitment to resolve 
the restitution issue by ordering restitution in the amount of 
$1922.29, with the balance of forfeited funds in the amount of 
$349.00 being applied to restitution.3 Within thirty days 
thereafter, Mr. Garner filed Notice of Appeal on June 13, 2002. 
By way of its modified Sentence, Judgment, and Commitment 
entered on May 14, 2002, the district court not only resolved the 
we made with Mr. Garner, we agreed to write a letter to you to 
indicate we are not asking you to extend his time in Alabama on 
account of the convictions here." 
3The modifications constituted modifications or amendments in a 
"material matter." Cf. ProMax Dev. Corp. v. Raile, 2000 UT 4, fll, 
998 P.2d 254. 
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restitution matter but it erroneously concluded that the State had 
fully complied with the plea agreement. Consequently, the 
district court's modifications were modifications or amendments in 
a "material matter," see ProMax, 2000 UT 4, at fll, 998 P.2d 254, 
in contrast to that set forth in Nielson v. Gurley, 888 P.2d 130, 
132-33 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (holding that modification of original 
judgment to include award of costs, being clerical in nature, does 
not affect any substantive rights of the litigants and hence does 
not create a new judgment for enlarging the time for appeal). As 
a result, the time for filing an appeal began to run anew, and Mr. 
Garner's Notice of Appeal, which was filed within thirty days of 
the May 14 modified Sentence, Judgment, and Commitment, was 
timely. 
In its Memorandum Decision, the court of appeals, based upon 
a clearly erroneous decision of another panel, erroneously 
concluded that the district court's modifications of the original 
Sentence and Judgment were not material in nature, and that the 
appeal time did not begin to run from the time of the modified 
Sentence and Judgment. See State v. Garner, 2 003 UT App. 72, p. 
2. Both decisions of the court of appeals not only conflict with 
the court of appeals' own precedent but with that of this Court as 
specifically set forth above. Id. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Garner respectfully asks this 
Court to reverse the court of appeals' summary dismissal of his 
appeal and thereby resolve the direct conflicts in the law created 
by the court of appeals' decision. Mr. Garner further requests 
that the Court remand this case to the court of appeals for a full 
and fair review of the district court's denial of his Motion to 
Dismiss. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 27th day of May, 2004. 
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ADDENDA 
No Addendum is utilized pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 24(a)(11). 
12 
